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FETAL RESEARCH
REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION:
RESEARCH ON THE FETUS
KAREN LEBACQZt
I. INTRODUCTION
OR MY REFLECTIONS on the Commission's Report and Recom-
mendations: Research on the Fetus (Report), I shall focus on two
areas: the Commission's struggle with questions of distributive jus-
tice and its definition of research. I believe that in the long run the
most significant contribution of this Report may be the attention it
focuses upon the requirements of distributive justice as they impact upon
research. I also believe that the most potentially damaging aspect of
this Report is its adoption of a distinction between "therapeutic re-
search" and "nontherapeutic research." I shall therefore limit my
comments to these two issues, one of which advances the discussion of
the ethics of research and the other of which has the potential for
retarding that discussion.
II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND RESEARCH
The rash of contemporary concern for the ethics of research using
human subjects dates from the exposure, during the Nuremberg trials,
of atrocities committed in Nazi Germany under the name of "scientific
experimentation." The Nazi experiments shocked the world not simply
because they were often unnecessary and poorly designed scientifically,
but more importantly, because they flagrantly abused human subjects
by using them against their will. Hence the Nuremberg Code, drafted
during the time of the trials as a standard for the conduct of research,
begins with the principle: "The voluntary consent of the human subject
is absolutely essential."' Since that time, most discussions of the ethics
t Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, Pacific School of Religion (currently
on leave of absence to serve as Consultant in Bioethics to the Director of Health for
the State of California); Member, National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research; Co-founder and Co-director, Joint
Program in Bioethics, Pacific School of Religion and University of California in
San Francisco; B.A., Wellesley College, 1966; M.A., Harvard University, 1969;
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1974.
1. Nuremberg Code, reprinted in NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Appendix to REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS 17-1, 17-2 (DHEW Pub. No.
(OS) 76-128, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
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of research have focused upon the requirements for voluntary consent,
or "informed consent," as it tends to be called today.
The consent requirement derives. from the ethical principle of
"respect for persons."2 This principle requires that persons be treated
as ends in themselves, never merely as a means to the ends of another.
When persons are to be treated as means to an end - as happens when
human subjects are used -in research - such treatment is justified only
if the individuals are also respected as persons with their own ends.
Requiring researchers to obtain consent from a prospective subject is
one way of ensuring that the ends of the person are respected and that
thekperson is not simply used as means to another's ends. The person's
expression of will - voluntary consent - justifies the use of that
person as a means to the ends of the research project. Arguments about
what is required for consent to be fully "voluntary" (for example,
whether prisoners or. students can give voluntary consent) or fully
"informed" (for example,' whether incomplete disclosure is ever per-
missible) are largely attempts to refine the meaning of the principle
"respect for persons" as it applies to the research setting. It is here
that most arguments about the ethics of research have focused. To date,
the ethics of research have been largely an ethics of respect for persons.
Fundamental though this principle is, it does not stand alone as a
basic principle against which human activity must be judged or by which
such activity must be justified. Respect for persons spells out the require-
ments for ethical conduct toward each person. In the research setting,
the principle of respect for persons requires that the researcher seek the
knowing and voluntary consent of the subject before proceeding with
the research; but it does not tell the researcher who among available
potential subjects should be approached with the invitation to partici-
pate. The principle that deals with the comparative treatment of per-
sons is the principle of "distributive justice."8 This principle requires
that persons be treated fairly, that is, that they neither receive more
benefits nor bear more burdens than they deserve.
While no less important than the principle of respect for persons,
the principle of distributive justice has been largely ignored in dis-
cussions of the ethics of research. This may be due to the common
assumption that the risks from research are borne by individual subjects,
while the benefits go to society at large. Thus, concern about the dis-
-tribution of burdens and benefits has appeared to be almost superfluous,
and the focus has been on how to protect those who are the subjects
2. See J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT?
82(1975).
3. See W. K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 49 (1973).
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bearing the burdens.' This assumption is questionable, because not all
research involves risk for the subject. Furthermore, much research
involves only very small risks.5 It is also possible that participation in
certain research is not a burden but a benefit. If so, then questions are
rightly asked about who should receive that benefit by being asked to
participate. Even if participating in research is the burden it is often
thought to be, there is still the question of who should bear the burden in
order that others may benefit. The Commission's recent report on the
use of prisoners as research subjects6 amply demonstrates that concerns
about justice should be raised any time one segment of the population
bears burdens in order that others may benefit - as an example, when
black prisoners risk skin infections in order to participate in research on
the development of sun tan lotions which will be used primarily by
whites.
In the area of fetal research, the Commission encountered questions
of distributive justice at several points. The one that generated the
most controversy and is most memorable had to do with the comparative
treatment of fetuses-going-to-term and fetuses-about-to-be-aborted. Is
it ever justifiable to use fetuses that are about to be aborted as subjects
in research that would not be done on fetuses going to term? Does
such a use constitute a fundamental injustice, subjecting one class of
fetuses to unequal treatment? As the Report reflects, the Commission
spent many hours deliberating this issue and was divided in its final
conclusions. Because the comparative treatment of fetuses is an issue
that is so easily misunderstood, I shall elaborate upon the requirements
of justice with respect to it.
The formal requirements of justice are expressed in the phrase,
"treat similar cases similarly." Much depends upon what is under-
stood to constitute "similar cases." Much also depends upon what is
taken to constitute "similar treatment." While the Commission agreed
on the meaning of "similar cases," its members disagreed upon the
meaning of "similar treatment," and thus upon the application of the
basic requirements of justice to the case at hand. Specifically, the mem-
bers agreed that the "case" of the fetus-about-to-be-aborted is similar
to the "case" of the fetus-going-to-term in that both fetuses are vulner-
able subjects deserving of protection from harm. The fact that one
fetus was scheduled to die did not make it less deserving of respect or
4. This would seem to be the view that underlies Hans Jonas' famous treatment
of the issue. See Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human
Subjects, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 1 (P. Freund ed. 1970).
5. See, e.g., Cardon, Dommel, & Trumble, Injuries to Research Subjects, 295
NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 650, 651-54 (1976).
6. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH
INVOLVING PRISONERS (DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-131, 1975).
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protection. The members of the Commission agreed in principle that
the fetus-going-to-term and the fetus-about-to-be-aborted deserve equal
protection and respect. The "cases" are similar.
There was disagreement, however, as to what equal treatment or
equal protection meant. Some argued that it would require both "cases,"
i.e., both classes of fetuses, to be subjected to the same experimental
procedures. For example, Commissioner David Louisell in his dissent-
ing statement charges that the Commission denied equal protection to
the fetus-about-to-be-aborted because it declined to require that such
a fetus be used as a research subject only in those situations when a
fetus-going-to-term could be used as a subject. I believe, however, that
this interpretation of what "similar treatment of similar cases" requires
is based upon a misapprehension of what "similar treatment" means.
I would argue that "similar treatment" does not mean subjecting both
"9cases" to the same procedure, but putting both to equal risk. By way
of illustration, suppose that a friend of mine and I are invited to par-
ticipate in an experiment to measure the effects of exercise on body
metabolism at high altitudes. We will both run in place, do sit-ups,
and so on, at exactly the same altitude. Thus, we will both be subjected
to the same procedures. Is it fair to ask both of us to participate? On
the surface, it seems that it is. But suppose that my friend carries the
gene for sickle cell anemia. In that case, doing the same exercises that
I do at the same altitude will put her at more risk than I. The risks
are therefore not equal, and the burdens of participation in research
would not be distributed equitably. Justice is ensured not by subjecting
us to the same procedures, but by providing us equal protection from
risk.
I would argue that the same holds true for the two classes of
fetuses under consideration. If it can be demonstrated that one class of
fetuses would be put at more risk than the other by being subjected to
the same procedures, then it may not be fair to use that class of fetuses.
This is the case with much research on the fetus, where the ingestion
of a drug by the woman will take several weeks to affect fetal tissue if
it crosses the placenta. If a fetus is aborted within a period of several
weeks, no damage will yet have been done to fetal tissue. For the
fetus that is brought to term, however, there may be lifelong damage
resulting from the ingestion of that drug. The risk differs for the two
classes of fetuses, and it is therefore not just to use both of them.
The meaning of this argument is easily misunderstood. It does not
justify anything that we do to a fetus that is going to be aborted. Nor
does it deprive that fetus of equal protection and respect. It only specifies
the meaning of protection and respect with regard to research: equal
[VOL. 22 : p. 297
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protection means equal protection from risk, not necessarily subjection
to the same procedures. One must not mistake this as an argument
that "since the fetus is going to die anyway, it doesn't matter what is
done to it." It does indeed matter. The principle of justice applies to
condemned human subjects. But what that principle requires is equal
protection, and equal protection is calculated in terms of the risk of
harm to the subject. That risk is affected by the subject's condemned
state. The fetus-about-to-be-aborted will not be harmed by the research
if it is subsequently aborted; its "risk of harm," therefore, is calculated
by multiplying the risk of harm were it to be carried to term by the
probability that the woman will change her mind about the abortion
and carry it to term. Since the chances that a woman will change her
mind once she has contacted a clinic about abortion are generally less
than one in one hundred,' the risk to the fetus-about-to-be-aborted is
about one one-hundredth of the risk to the fetus going to term. It is
on that basis that one can say that justice requires that fetuses to be
carried to term not be subjected to some experiments which might be
done on fetuses scheduled for abortion.
No doubt controversy about the exact meaning of "similar treat-
ment of similar cases" will continue. What is significant is that this
area of concern has been opened up for reflection. Research ethics will
no longer be simply an ethics of respect for person, but also an ethics
of distributive justice.
III. THE DEFINITION OF RESEARCH
While I affirm in general the Commission's recommendations re-
garding research on the fetus and in particular its treatment of the
question of justice, I have come to think that its use of the terms "thera-
peutic research" and "nontherapeutic research" is most unfortunate.
Although these terms are popularly used today, I hope that the Com-
mission's adoption of them has not given them undeserved credibility.
As a result of much further reflection, I would now argue that "thera-
peutic research" is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, the use of
this term obscures the nature of research and hence obfuscates moral
analysis of research.
Research is a class of activities - usually, the gathering and
analyzing of data in accord with scientific principles - designed to
produce generalizable knowledge.8 As such, it has nothing to do with
the treatment or "therapy" of an individual. To be sure, we sometimes
7. Bracken, The Stability of the Decision to Seek Induced Abortion, Appendix,
supra note 1, at 16-5, 16-6.
8. This definition was tentatively adopted by the Commission in February 1976.
1976-1977]
5
Lebacqz: Reflections on the Report and Recommendations of the National Com
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
do research concerning the treatment of individuals. For example, we
compare two modes of treatment for the same disorder to see which
is more efficacious, or we attempt to validate an accepted mode of
"therapy" that has been accepted without being validated. Such re-
search has been dubbed "therapeutic," either because one component
of our total activity involves the provision of therapy for the individual,
or because it is hoped that what we learn about the individual's disorder
or our attempted mode of therapy can then be used to facilitate the
treatment of that individual. While both of these links between therapy
and research are legitimate, they are indeed links between therapy and
research; the research itself is not "therapeutic."
A rather typical example of research that would be called "thera-
peutic" by many is the following: It is standard and accepted therapy
for certain forms of bone cancer to amputate the limb in which the
cancerous tumor is found. However, since such mutilation has life-
long deleterious consequences, we would like to find an equally effica-
cious treatment that is less disfiguring. Suppose a new drug that has
been tested in adults but not yet in children offers some promise of
retarding the growth of the tumor and hence some promise for an
amputation-free therapy. We wish to do research to test this potential
new therapy in children as compared to the accepted therapy. Our
subjects will be divided into two groups; one will receive the new drug,
the other will receive the accepted therapy. The comparative efficacy
will be tested by measuring morbidity and mortality over a period of
five years. Is this "therapeutic research?"
Some will of course say "yes," because all of the children are re-
ceiving therapy during the course of the research. But note, first, that
the point of doing the research is to find out whether the drug will
work in children. It is not clear then, that the group of children who
get the drug are receiving "therapy." Indeed, it is precisely the point
of the research to find out whether they are! The research can hardly
be called "therapeutic" before one finds out that therapy is indeed being
given.
But let us suppose for the moment that the new drug is therapeutic.
Even so, it is not clear in what way the research by which that drug is
compared to another mode of treatment can itself be called "therapeutic."
If the children can get either of the therapies (the drug or the amputa-
tion) without being involved in a research project designed to compare
them, then the research is not -integral to their therapy but is incidental
to it. The activities which are done for purposes of generalizing our
knowledge about the treatment of bone cancer are not themselves "thera-
[VOL. 22 : p. 297
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putic," even though they may be done in the context of providing
therapy.
Some will argue that nothing additional need be done to the child
over and above what would be done during the course of providing
therapy. The drug is given (or the limb is amputated), and the phy-
sician follows the progress of the child as would be done normally. No
additional interventions into the life of the child need be made; nothing
appears to be added to the therapy, and yet "research" is done. Surely
then, the research must be "therapeutic," since it involves no additional,
nontherapeutic interventions into the life of the child.
The fallacy in this line of argument can be seen quite easily when
we recognize that if indeed all that is done is that the drug or amputa-
tion is provided and the child followed over time, then the "research"
component - the component which allows us to generalize knowledge
- has not yet been performed. The "research" here begins at the
point where the charts of the children are compared to each other, and
where this comparison is used as the basis for an analysis of the com-
parative efficacy of the two modes of treatment. Research is not done
if the only activity is the provision of therapy to the child with at-
tendant follow-up activities for the sake of therapy. Research is done
only when data is analyzed so as to generalize knowledge. In this case,
that analysis has little to do with the provision of therapy.'
Confusion arises because we sometimes label an entire set of
activities "research" when they are presented as a package deal in a
protocol outlining both the therapeutic intervention and the evaluation
procedures to be used. The fact that therapeutic interventions are
given as part of a total research protocol does not, in itself, however,
justify the labelling of that research as "therapeutic."'"
Nor, in the example given, could the research be called "thera-
peutic" on grounds that it will influence the future therapy of these
children, or that their treatment will be changed depending upon the
9. Indeed, once the true nature of research is exposed, we see that much re-
search is noninvasive data gathering and analysis. The actual activities done for
research purposes (i.e., to enable us to produce generalizable knowledge) often in-
volve no physical risk at all to subjects, as is the case in this example. It is rather
the experimental therapies which involve risk - both the risk of foregoing the ac-
cepted therapy, and the risk of unforeseen adverse effects.
10. There is one other occasion on which we are tempted to call research "thera-
peutic": when our access to therapy is conditioned upon our willingness to participate
as a subject in a research project. For example, it is my understanding that growth
hormone is available only to those persons who are willing to participate in research
designed to validate its use. In this case, since "therapy" depends upon participation
in research, one is tempted to link the two and call the research itself "therapeutic."
Strictly speaking, however, the research is not therapeutic - it is simply the condition
to receiving the therapy.
1976-19771
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outcome of the comparative study. It is regrettably true that once a
child's limb has been amputated, it cannot be restored. It is therefore
too late to change the course of therapy for that child. There is one
possible exception here: the case where the child later develops another
cancerous tumor in -another limb. In this case, the child's participation
in the earlier research project may indeed influence his or her therapy,
and in this sense one might stretch the meaning of "therapeutic" to
call the research "therapeutic" for the child. Note, however, if we do
so, that almost all research will be called "therapeutic," because it will
later influence the future treatment of someone. Thus the distinction
between "therapeutic research" and "nontherapeutic research" breaks
down. Moreover, we have stretched the meaning of "therapeutic" to the
point of the absurd. It remains true that "therapeutic research" is a
contradiction in terms, and that -no stretching of the term "therapeutic"
will make it sensible.
No doubt the reason that this term has come into popular usage is
not that most people stretch the meaning of "therapeutic," but that they
stretch the meaning of "research." At the time when the Commission
issued its report on the fetus, I did not understand the difference be-
tween "research" and "experimentation," since the two words are used
almost interchangeably in much of the literature. Since "experimenta-
tion" can indeed be either "therapeutic" or "nontherapeutic," the con-
fusion between experimentation and research is no doubt what leads
most often to the classification of research in terms of being either
"therapeutic" or "nontherapeutic." Once research is carefully defined,
however, the distinction becomes clear.
Moreover, once research is carefully defined, moral analysis of the
conduct of research is facilitated, and mistakes in analysis come easily
to light. For example, Paul Ramsey argues that parents have the right
to give consent on behalf of their children only for interventions designed
to improve the well-being of those children; thus he -approves what he
calls "therapeutic research," but disapproves of the use of children or
fetuses in "nontherapeutic research."'" We see now that even in
"therapeutic research," some activities will be done that are not thera-
peutic for the children. Do parents have the right to consent to such
activities? If so, then they are consenting to nontherapeutic inter-
ventions.
Of course, most of these "interventions" will consist of comparisons
of data already gathered during the course of providing therapy and
11. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT As PERSON 13-19 (1970). See also Ramsey, The
Enforcement of Morals: Nontherapeutic Research on Children, 6 HASTINGS CENTER
REp. 21, 22 (1976).
VOL. 22 : p. 297
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they are therefore in no way invasive of the child's well-being. It is
also possible, however, that in order to gather data by which we can
generalize about treatments for a specific disorder, we will have to do
additional maneuvers that are invasive. These interventions are not
"therapeutic" for the child, since they are done solely for the purpose
of gathering data and analyzing it in order to generalize our knowledge.
Do parents have the right to give consent for such maneuvers? If so,
then they are consenting to invasive, nontherapeutic interventions. The
fact that these interventions are done in a research protocol which also
includes the provision of therapy does not, it seems to me, automatically
justify parental consent for them. If Ramsey and others are genuinely
concerned about the prevention of nontherapeutic interventions into
the life of the child, then much of what has been known as "therapeutic
research" will not be permissible.
Alternatively, I would argue that much "nontherapeutic research"
is permissible, since, like much "therapeutic research," it involves only
observation or minimal risk to the child. Since we do allow parents to
make decisions on behalf of their children provided the child will not
be subjected to great risk, children should be permitted to participate
as research subjects provided there is no great risk involved.
Of course, there may be risks involved in the use of an experimental
drug or other procedure. It may not be the research that puts the child
at risk, but rather the attempt to provide therapy. Only when the
research component is separated from the therapeutic component do
we see how very difficult the providing of therapy itself can be as a
moral problem. When there is an accepted therapy, is it ever justifiable
to withhold it in order to try something new which might or might not
prove to be therapeutic ? Herein lies one of the thorniest questions about
the ethics of experimentation on human subjects; however, it is a ques-
tion that is separable from the ethics of research. Fortunately, it is a
question that does not arise frequently in the context of fetal research
and experimentation, since there are few "therapies" available that can
be given in utero. Additionally, we are rarely in a position to withhold
a known therapy in order to try something new because almost every-
thing we try in order to provide therapy for the fetus is experimental.
This makes it very important that we do research to test the validity of
such experimental interventions. Far from being a questionable activity,
therefore, research is a very necessary and very salutary activity. It
can prevent much harm from the use of unverified "therapies."
Unfortunately, the Commission's adoption of the terms "thera-.
peutic research" and "nontherapeutic research" tends to perpetuate a
language which only serves to obfuscate moral analysis by preventing
1976-1977]
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close attention to all the components of a research protocol. Moral
analysis is better served, and fetuses and other vulnerable subjects are
better protected, by dropping the language "therapeutic research" and
"nontherapeutic research" and directly analyzing each of the components
of a proposed research activity. I hope that future discussions of the
ethics of research, including the discussions of the Commission, will
adopt this approach.
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